Editor Note: This article was written in 2022 and remains unchanged; events and developments after this date are not reflected.*

Abstract

Nagorno- Karabakh is one of the disputed territories in the Caucasus, after the post-soviet era. As diversity and population are more than other areas of the Caucasus, Nagorno has been a contentious and conflict-ridden area. The war, which began before the collapse of the Soviet Union, lasted approximately six years, resulting in tens of thousands of military casualties and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. Although the decisions and laws of the Minsk Group and the United Nations, the two countries have developed new tactics and strategies for the situation in the territory over the past 26 years. In 2020 September Azerbaijan and its supporters Turkey, Israel- the UK in the background- launched an attack by Artsakh Forces. After 44 days, the president of the Armenian government Pashinyan accepted the devastating defeat. Negotiations between countries have resulted in a peace agreement and the era of “no peace nor war” has come to an end. The article is intended to examine the context of the war, which ended in a short time contrary to the first war, and the effectiveness of Turkey's grand strategy in this victory. Meanwhile, the future of Karabakh in post-war relationships and its geostrategic role in the Caucasus will be argued.

Keywords: Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey, Grand Strategy, Caucasus, Zangezur Corridor

Introduction

The Karabakh region, where there has been a long-term struggle between Azerbaijan and Armenia and short-term military conflicts, is a mountainous region of the South Caucasus. Nagorno- Karabakh, where there were minor clashes and conflicts until 1988, suddenly witnessed a conflict whose start was unclear. As the conflicts intensified and turned into war, a period of uncertainty that would last for many years was entered. Due to the late involvement of regional countries and major international actors, a ceasefire was achieved in the war after 6 years. As a result of the war, which left tens of thousands of military and civilian casualties and led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people, Armenia captured not only Karabagh but also 7 regions that are Azerbaijani territory. After the war, Azerbaijan closed its borders to Armenians. The same decision was endorsed and carried out by Turkey. Despite the assumption that the elites governing both countries will act to protect the current status quo for reasons such as protecting their political and economic interests, Azerbaijan launched an attack on these regions in September 2020[1]

After 26 years of Armenian control, because of the 44-day war, in which both sides suffered heavy losses, came to the controversial Sushi/Shusha region, Armenia agreed to sit at the ceasefire table by surrendering. Contrary to expectations, the last war showed how fragile and sensitive the conflict in the Frozen Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was built on, and how inadequate the peace efforts were. This surprise attack came as a puzzled to many segments of Armenia to other regional and international actors who are influential in the Caucasus. The international news that Azerbaijan has relocated the paramilitary jihadists used in the Syrian civil war to the Iranian-Armenian border with the assistance of Turkey has worried the neighboring country, Iran[2]

Upon this situation, Iran, which carried out moderate policies in the first days of the war, shifted its neutrality and appeasement policy to a discursive and militaristic position to the detriment of Azerbaijan. Pashinyan, who took office after the so-called velvet revolution in Armenia, which resulted in the dismissal of the nationalist ex-president, was ruling the country during the war. Pashinyan’s objections to Russian control over his country and his aims to shift Armenia from the Russian orbit to the west created a situation against Armenia on the ground. Russia had a chance to recover its achievements from the Soviet era. Putin did not give an appointment for a long time to Pashinyan, who wanted to meet with him during the war and he started to implement a multi-player plan that included putting Armenia back on its old domain.

On the other side of the war, Azerbaijan claimed that it had launched a legitimate operation intending to liberate the occupied lands indirectly the UN with the use of the military units commanded by the Turkish generals and the equipment of the Turkish army [3] .As a result of the Azerbaijani forces, supported by Israeli and Turkish military vehicles from the air, seizing strategic points on the land, the Armenian government signed a ceasefire agreement after the tripartite agreement, which was held under the mediation of Russia. One of the contents of the cease-fire included the opening of the connection of Nakhchivan, an autonomous region of Azerbaijan, to the main country by a transport road across Armenia.

Although months have passed since the cease-fire was signed, countries have still not signed a treaty on precise border determination. Contrarily to the first war, the victory in such a short time has opened a new window for Azerbaijan and Turkey in the Caucasus. It is important to understand Turkey's Transcaucasian policy and its grand strategy to understand the consequences of the Karabakh war. This victory in Azerbaijan, which is the first stage of Turkey's grand strategy that includes the Caucasus and Central Asia, has led to the redefinition of regional equations.

Hypothesis: Turkey's grand strategy its economic, politic,al and military support to Azerbaijan provided the Second Karabakh war to end in favor of Azerbaijan.

The article aims to illuminate the process leading to the victory of the second war by examining the roles played by Turkey in the first Karabakh War and the post-war period. In addition, the influence of the cooperation and competition between Turkey and Russia in the Caucasus grounds will be argued.

Turkey’s Role in The First Karabakh War

The Treaty of Kars, which Turkey signed for the Eastern borders under the mediation of the Soviets after the war of liberation, helped to separate the Caucasian and Turkish borders. The agreement did not enter into force immediately, and the borders were not immediately determined [4] For this reason, Turkey, which became the guarantor for the Nakhchivan lands with the Kars Treaty, steered towards a regional guarantor that would expand over time as it got stronger. The relations of the Soviets with Turkey and Turkey's relations with the Armenians were one of the reasons why the lands to be established on the border, which would be controlled by the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments, conflicted. The Armenian diaspora's genocide allegations and the recognition of Southern and Eastern Turkey as ancient lands, which they call Western Armenia, were seen as a hostile step by Turkey's founding leader, Atatürk[5] The new establishment of the Soviets and the search for allies made Atatürk and Lenin friends and leaders of good neighbor countries. Instead of an Irredentist enemy, a neighboring government called one nation, two states seemed more reasonable by Turkey. The Soviet administration did not want to disappoint their Turkish allies, so they made a decision against the Armenians, which they thought were far from the view of a Socialist administration. The recognition of Karabakh as the territory of Azerbaijan was not particularly welcomed by diaspora Armenians [6]

In 1988, the demands of the Armenians to transfer the Karabakh region to Armenia were rejected by Moscow and Baku. One year later, the Karabakh administration was given directly to Baku by Moscow. This move and the Operation Ring that the Soviets started against the Armenians were perceived as 'undeclared war' and “State terrorism” by Ter Petrosian, Former President of Armenia [7]

A few years later, in 1991, Azerbaijan and Armenia gained their independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After this date, the conflicts left its place to a war between two independent states. Turkey is the first country to recognize Azerbaijan in the international arena. Despite this, Turkey's role in the first Karabakh war was discussed for a long time by Azerbaijani leaders and Turkish opposition. While the Turkish population and the opposition supported Azerbaijan in the first war of Karabakh, it was not so easy for the government because of the different dimensions of the war. There are several reasons why Turkey has not been directly implicated in the war as military support to Azerbaijan.

Since Turkey became a member of NATO, the position of NATO has had an important place in Turkey's foreign policy decisions. As the war was not between member countries, they wanted to show the most pragmatic approach in terms of regional peace and security that would not interfere with its stability. For this reason, Member States have refrained from providing support that would have a direct impact on the war. At the same time, the Turkish Prime Minister of the period said that he was afraid possible Turkish support could organize the world public opinion and countries in favor of Armenia[8].

These reasons alone are not sufficient to summarize the country's policy. In 1992, the intensification of Turkey's conflicts with the guerrilla organization PKK, which fights for an independent Kurdish state, also caused the country's direct participation in the war to be discussed among the administrators.

Elchibey's victory in the June elections that year also confused Turkey. Elchibey's nationalist statements, which are anti-Iranian and anti-Russian, and that claims Azerbaijan would establish a united state with Azerbaijanis living in Iran, alarmed his neighbors. While Iran was worried about the nationalist uprising and independence movements within its borders, Russia was also worried that the Turkish states, whose after the victory of Azerbaijan was the backyard of the Soviets, would support these policies [9]. Turkey's refusal of Elchibey's request for four military helicopters and $200 million also shows that it does not want to engage in direct conflict with regional powers.

Even though it did not provide military support, this did not mean that Turkey was ignoring the war. On the contrary, Turkey has made intense efforts to achieve a ceasefire with the United Nations, other regional and international actors. Haydar Aliyev, in his tactical visit to Turkey in February 93, aimed to attract the Turkish authorities to his side by saying that “we are two states and one nation”. In 1993, the ceasefire was added to the agenda as a result of Turkey's diplomatic pressures on Armenia and the UN.

Thus the UN adopted four different resolutions until the end of the same year. All resolutions recognized that Armenia occupied the Nagorno-Karabakh region and demanded its withdrawal from the regions it had seized[10]. Turkey was unsatisfied with this and has unilaterally closed its land borders with Armenia since 1993. Turkey imposed three conditions for Armenia to reopen its borders. The aim was to abandon the allegations of genocide, to return to the pre-1988 status in Karabakh, and to recognize the limits set by the Kars and Gyumri agreement[11]. These three conditions would be repeated and brought to the agenda by different governments in varying tones of voice in the following years.

On the other hand, the Armenian diaspora was trying to put pressure on Azerbaijan with lobbying activities and demonstrations, especially in America. As a result of these activities, Act Section 907, which puts American aid ahead of Azerbaijan until it respects international human rights, was passed by the American Congress[12] .In 1994, the ceasefire negotiations started when Azerbaijani leader Heydar Aliyev demanded peace through diplomatic channels. On May 16, 1994, the Defense Ministers of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia and the Commander-in-Chief of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army signed the ceasefire agreement in Moscow [13]. The three stages envisaged by the Russians as the only solution to N-K conflict were ‘entry into force of a cease-fire and deployment of intervention forces withdrawal of troops from occupied territories, restoration of lines of communication, return of refugees, and negotiation on the status of N-K[14] .

Turkey's Azerbaijan and Caucasus Policies between 1994-2020

To understand the outcome of the Second Karabakh War, it would be useful to flash on the events of the first post-war period. Turkey has tried to determine its foreign policy according to the Misak-ı Milli (National Pact) developed by its founder leader Ataturk since independence. In summary, the pact includes some of the lands that the Ottoman Empire lost in Syria, Iraq, the Balkans, and the Caucasus after the First World War came under the trust of Turkey or at least under the influence [15]. In 1991, with the collapse of the soviets, several Turkish states, including Azerbaijan, gained their independence. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave Turkey more room to maneuver to establish better relations with these breakaway states and implement its Caucasian strategy.

When the threat of the Soviets and the task of protecting NATO's eastern border against the Soviets were over, an opportunity arose for Turkey to implement its expansion plans in the Caucasus. Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a protocol for co-operation on the activities of members of the Armed Forces Delegation in 1996 and the training of the health delegation [16]. A declaration was signed in 1997 about the expansion of the protocol and strategy cooperation to regulate the flight of civilians and military vehicles to be built within a ten-kilometer area on both sides of the Azerbaijan border line[17]. In 2000, a new agreement was signed between the armies of Azerbaijan and Turkey, which included technical information and economic assistance. When the 9/11 terrorist attack occurred in the USA in 2001, Azerbaijan supported America's fight against terrorism. With the support of Turkey, Azerbaijan sent its troops to Afghanistan as part of the NATO mission [18]. Azerbaijan was not satisfied with this and opened its airspace to the United States.

As Turkey became a strong military and diplomatic country in the region, it wanted to expand the scope and content of the agreements with Azerbaijan. On August 16, 2010, Turkey and Azerbaijan signed the 'Strategic Partnership Mutual Assistance Agreement' which includes joint action against a possible third-country attack in Baku. One month after this Agreement, on September 15, 2010, the President of the period, Abdullah Gul, and the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, decided to establish a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (YDSK) between the two countries.

Turkish Grand Strategy

Turkey has effectively used its soft power and public diplomacy to reach or at least compel the National Pact borders set by its founder, Atatürk. As for the Caucasus, Turkey's historical and ethnic ties are connected with the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the stories in Turkish myths come from a city called Otuken, located on the border of Russia, has been a source of motivation for an irredentist foreign policy [19]. The fact that the Soviets were the dominant power in the region for a long time caused Turkey to keep its broad plans about the Turkish states under the table during the cold war. The collapse of the Soviet Union opened a window for Turkey to implement its plans and strategy [20].

With the independence of the Turkish republics, it was time to expand direct relations. While Turkey was struggling with terrorism, economic and political instability in the 1990s, it started to expand its relations significantly by signing security and trade agreements with Azerbaijan and other Turkish states in the mid-2000s [21] In the years 2010, inflation had decreased in Turkey, arrangements had been made for the transition to a market economy and accession negotiations with the European Union continued. Democratic channels were established for the solution of the Kurdish problem, and political stability took the place of the transitory coalition governments of the 1990s. Beginning in 2010, Turkey adopted amendments to the scope of military exercises and mutual military agreements with neighboring countries. The AKP in power lost votes in the elections held on 7 June 2015 and had to form a coalition, which required the government to change its place in the political spectrum.

The attempted coup that occurred in 2016 led Erdogan, who defines himself as a conservative Islamist, to rally all power in his hands. Erdogan's foreign policy, which has allied with the extreme right-wing nationalist party, National Movement Party(MHP), has also evolved into further consolidation, security, and militarization[22]. After the coup, the security agreements between Azerbaijan and Turkey led to direct arms sales, the increasing number of joint military exercises, and the increasing rhetoric against the occupation of Armenia.

Emphasis on Armenia and Occupied word in Presidential Statements by Years

Source: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/

With the presidential referendum held during the state of emergency in 2018, the form of government in Turkey was replaced by presidential. After that date, the president had the power to be elected directly by the population and to form the government on his own. The increase of the power in domestic politics paved the way for the plans to implement the irredentist policy abroad. Exports and arms sales between the two countries started to increase after this period.

The number of military exercises between the two countries started to increase after 2018. Contrary to previous years, the number of exercises has become more comprehensive in terms of war scenarios with the number of soldiers participating and the range of weapons used. Although Turkey is not the main arms supplier to Azerbaijan, a large part of the casualties inflicted on the Armenian army were due to the new generation Turkish drones and weapons. Between 2011 and 2022, Turkey only accounted for 3% of Azerbaijan's arms imports [23]. From 2018 until September 2020, when the Second Karabakh war started, Turkey's arms exports to Azerbaijan covered 30% of Azerbaijan's total exports between these dates [24]. These include drone systems, which cause the most damage during wartime.

Another important reason for the development of relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan is China's BRI initiative. This project, which promises to give a chance to countries that have missed globalization, aims to connect Asia and Europe with sea, railway and highways. America's efforts to besiege China by sea, together with its allies in Australia and the Pacific, have made the construction of the high-speed railway that will extend from Shanghai to Turkey more important. This railway, which includes Turkic Council member states and Iran, aims to maintain a global and continuous chain that will extend from the Caucasus to Turkey. Therefore, the most important difference that separates the second Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia from the first is that Turkey, which is a transit country between China and Europe, wants to consolidate its regional dominance by using its geostrategic position and to realize its political and economic interests. The region connecting the Autonomous Nakhchivan and the Republic of Azerbaijan, known as the Zangezur Corridor, is also a part of this global supply chain. The shipment of gas obtained from the Caspian Sea to Europe and the supply of products imported from Turkey to Asian markets were seen as a step that would provide mutual benefit, restore the vitality of the historical silk road and contribute to regional stability.

A road and railway construction project that will link Turkey with Asian countries was impossible until 2020 due to Armenia's control in these regions. After the victory of Azerbaijan, Aliyev and Russian President Putin presented three proposals to Armenia for the definitive determination of the borders with Armenia [25]. Although Pashinyan said that he looks at all three proposals positively in return for Azerbaijan's withdrawal from the post-war occupied area, Aliyev also said that they will not withdraw from these lands belonging to Armenia unless an official guarantee is given for the Zangezur Corridor [26] Although the intervention in the Karabakh conflict is supported by Turkey's historical, cultural and political ties with the Turkic states, it is clear that the main motivation is economic interests. Turkey wants to use its strategic position for natural gas flow from Asian countries with rich underground resources to the European market.

At the same time, Turkey's increasing global arms exports are also seeking new markets. In 2018, Turkey did not clarify its position in the conflicts that broke out before the velvet revolution in Armenia and took the decision to attack Armenia with Azerbaijan in 2020, taking advantage of the conjuncture created by the Pashinyan period following the change of power. In view of the political economy between the two countries, the situation can be defined more clearly and within precise boundaries.

Turkey-Azerbaijan Economic Relations

Although Azerbaijan-Turkey relations are generally evaluated through the rhetoric of one nation, two states, the economic ties between the two countries started to get stronger with the shift of the world's economic and energy political centre of gravity to Asia. The Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement, which regulates the legal infrastructure of the economic relations between the two independent states in November 1992 after the independence of Azerbaijan, is accepted as a reference to these relations. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan was a political and military ally of Turkey until 2010, its economic cooperation until 2010 faced the intervention of Russia and Iran [27].

With the Strategic Cooperation Agreement in 2010, the relations between the two countries entered a different and advanced phase in every field. In the 12th article of the treaty, there are expressions regarding the energy cooperation between the two countries. Accordingly, countries will take all necessary measures for the continuous operation of energy projects of global importance passing through their territories in order to ensure global and regional energy security and strengthen their economies in the field of energy, and they will increase their cooperation in this direction. On October 25, 2011, the first meeting of the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council was held with the participation of the leaders and Ministers of Defense of both countries [28].

At the meeting, there was also the first agreement for the TANAP natural gas pipeline, which is planned to play an important role in regional and global supply in the future. After 2011, the Azerbaijan-Turkey High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between the two countries was held in the other country, respectively, every year. The transportation of Azerbaijan oil and natural gas, as well as the oil and natural gas of the countries on the eastern coast of the Caspian, to Turkey via the Caspian Sea and then Azerbaijan, and from there to third countries has great economic importance [29]. Energy cooperation, which started with TPAO's share in Azerbaijan oil production during Heydar Aliyev's term, continued in a normal course until the middle of 2010, as in other fields. The trade volume, which was approximately 200 million dollars in 1991, increased to two and a half billion dollars by the end of 2016.

In view of the energy sector of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey, there is still a detail to be added. In both countries, Authoritarian regimes have been in power for a long time, in which oligarchs close to the governments are dominant around the main sectors such as energy, construction and tourism. The acquisition of PETKIM by the Azerbaijan state company SOCAR in 2008 is an example of the other side of the relations [29]. The current prime minister of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, was the vice-president of the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) from 1994 to 2003. He was elected president after his father Heydar Aliyev fell ill. According to the Malta Documents revealed by the European Investigative Collaboration (EIC) consortium; SOCAR purchased five oil tankers known to belong to the Erdogan family through companies they established in Malta. SOCAR leased the ships to a Moscow-registered company called Frachtmortrans. Among the directors of this firm are people associated with SOCAR and British Petroleum (BP). President Erdoğan allowed Petkim to be sold to Azerbaijan, which derives most of its income from oil, despite being the second company that gave the best price in the tender, and in return, he provided his brother-in-law to have a stake. In the next step, these shares were transferred and a mainstream media was created that would target all the anti-government powers, especially Armenia.

After the sale of PETKIM, the investment wave of Azerbaijani billionaires began in Turkey. Illegal activities took place in cooperation with these billionaires and Turkish holding companies, especially Maksimov, who was personally granted Turkish citizenship by President Erdogan. By building luxury hotels and casinos on treasury lands, privatizing and operating ports, and monopolizing energy shipments, a cash flow mechanism of billions of dollars was established to be transferred to the companies they established in the tax haven. When the money was traced, the names of the business associates of President Erdogan and Azerbaijani Prime Minister Aliyev emerged [30]. While the leaders of both countries faced accusations of money laundering by the opposition following the leaks of the WikiLeaks and Pandora document, the accusations were ignored over time

Military Expenditures

Armenia and Azerbaijan have close military spending in terms of GDP. The table above represents the dollar value of the military expenditures of the two countries. As the graph shows, Azerbaijan's military expenditures since 2010 are approximately three times higher than those of Armenia. Russia's largest supplier position in 2010-2014 was replaced by Israel between 2015-2019. Although Turkey is not at the top of the list in terms of arms exports, the drone, air defense systems and electronic warfare systems delivered shortly before the start of the war were used effectively during the war [31]

Regional and International Actors

Minsk Group

OSCE is an important example in terms of showing how insufficient steps could be taken for the peaceful resolution of the Karabakh war for about 28 years and international peace efforts in frozen conflicts. The Minsk Group, which was established in 1992 to end the conflicts and carry out the peace process, continued its existence until the second Karabakh war. The 1994 ceasefire was negotiated by Russia, working Independently of, some tomes in deadly rivalry with, its Minsk Group partners. At the same time, OSCE was established in 1994, and it was decided to deploy peace forces to the region in order to prevent the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

In early 1995 a formal co-chairmanship of the Minsk Group was established for the first time, which soon came to overshadow the overall group [32] In 1996 and 2005, although the foreigners of the countries involved in the conflict came together, both sides accused each other of prolonging the conflict. Although the main task of the Minsk Group is considered and defined as ensuring the peace process, the interests of the Group members and the disagreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the status quo has drawn the Group's work to an observer position. The different interests of the group's co-chairs USA, France and Russia on the global politics chessboard also caused the Group to be excluded from peace negotiations in the second Karabakh war.

France, a member of the Minsk group, was the only country in the international community that gave direct political support to Armenia during the Second Karabakh War. There were several reasons for this situation. France-Turkey relations have been in a tense state since 2018 due to Turkey's support of the Sarraj government in Libya, the start of gas exploration activities within the Cyprus continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the military operation against the French allies in Syria. On the other hand, the concern that Turkey's sending paramilitary fighters to the war zone will increase the chaos in the region and Macron's desire to get the vote of the Armenian diaspora in the upcoming elections in France brought France indirectly against Azerbaijan and directly against Turkey in the war.

Although America was involved in the First Karabakh War for humanitarian aid and to have a voice in the peace process, it preferred to remain neutral in this war since the dynamics and dimensions of the Second Karabakh War were different. One of the reasons for this is Trump's foreign policy based on pulling American soldiers from Asia and the Middle East. In addition, Azerbaijan's involvement in NATO operations such as Kosovo and Afghanistan in the past, and Armenia's supply of arms by Russia may have made the Trump administration think that there is no reasonable reason to support this country. As a result, Trump remained silent throughout the war and largely kept America out of the conflict.

Russia’s Role in Second Karabakh War

Russia is a global factor with strong historical, cultural, political and economic ties and strategic interests in the Caucasus. Therefore, Russia's intervention or not taking a position in any development close to its own borders would conflict with the interests of the country. As a matter of fact, Russia intervened directly and indirectly in all the conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia after the declaration of the Soviet Union. Even though the first Karabakh war coincided with the last years of the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence included Russia in the conflicts between these two countries in the role of negotiator, the second Karabakh war developed under the control of Russia in a way. Although Turkey supported Azerbaijan politically and militarily during the war and economically with its reconstruction activities after the war, it can be said that Turkey's steps were supported to a certain extent by Russia. Relations between the two countries are a mystery and puzzle for western states. While Russia supported Haftar's forces through Wagner forces in Libya, Turkey supported the Sarraj government. Despite this, Russian forces took their air defense systems out of the city during Turkey's unmanned aerial drones and ground-commanded operation to break through the siege of Tripoli by Haftar's forces. Thus, the siege of the city was broken with the help of Turkey. After that, the process that led to Haftar sitting at the negotiation table with Sarraj began. While Russia is signing an oil deal for the future, Turkey plans to have a say in the newly formed government after the Libyan elections. Not only in Libya, but also in Syria, a similar agreement model was implemented. In 2019, when Turkey attacked areas under the control of Kurdish forces in Syria after Trump's decision to withdraw, Russia opened its airspace to Turkey against its American ally, Kurdish forces. Russia did not respond to the call of the Kurdish authorities for days and agreed to act as a mediator between both sides after a week-long conflict. As a result, Turkey drove the Kurdish forces away from the border within 30km. Russia, on the other hand, made the Kurdish forces more dependent on itself, increased the number of military bases, and allowed the Assad regime to settle in the border points again. In addition, by isolating the United States from a significant part of Syria, it strengthened its right to have a say in the outcome of the war.

Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan faced a similar scenario in the last war. Russia at first remained silent in response to Turkey's attacks. Later, the news that Turkey was deporting the jihadists from Syria to the front began to take place in the Russian press [33]. Lastly, the Russian foreign minister announced that they were aware of the presence of Turkish intelligence in Karabakh. All these are interpreted as signs that Russia is ready to open a certain area to Turkey, but that Russia will determine the border. Since Azerbaijan is the only country in the Caucasus where there is no Russian presence within its borders, Russia made a proposal to settle the observer soldiers in the Zangezur corridor and the disputed areas for the ceasefire agreement [34]. Azerbaijan accepted the offer on the condition that the soldiers do not stay in the country for more than 5 years and that Turkey is included in the observation force. Thus, Russia officially established a military presence in Azerbaijan, brought Armenia back to its former orbit, and, having the right to have a say about the Zangezur corridor, profit came out as a result of the war. However, Turkey's presence in the Caucasus is getting closer to Russia and its increasing influence among the Central Asian states, as well as the export of advanced drone systems to former Soviet member countries such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, are unexpected developments for Russia that have the ability to create new problems in a long time.

Conclusion

The war of Karabakh or the 6-week war, which started in September 2020, ended with the victory of Azerbaijan and the surrender of Armenia. Turkey, as a long-term ally of Azerbaijan, came first among the factors that directly affected the outcome of the war. When examined historically, the relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey started in 1991, when the country declared its independence from the soviets. Relations with this country, which is a part of Turkey's historical foreign policy, entered a different phase in military, security, political and economic terms by the middle of 2010. With the agreements made in the energy, security, military and economic sectors, the export volume between the two countries continued to increase in the following years. The fact that Azerbaijan has not yet gained its independence, Turkey is dependent on NATO policies due to internal problems, political instability, inflation, and the Kurdish problem prevented Turkey from directly intervening in the war. Despite this, Turkey played an important role in the initiation of peace talks in the international community, especially with the UN, and in making decisions against Armenia. The decrease in inflation in 2010, the continuation of the peace process towards the Kurdish issue, political stability and the European Union membership process have also affected Turkey's relations with its neighbors in its foreign policy. Trade agreements with the Caucasian countries, especially with Azerbaijan, gained momentum in this period.

However, the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016 and the increasing terrorist attacks within the borders of Turkey paved the way for the current government to make an agreement with the extreme right-wing nationalists. After this date, Turkey's priorities ceased to increase its influence in these countries through peaceful relations with its neighbors and entered a more militaristic orbit. Joint military exercises with Azerbaijan and the statements that Azerbaijani lands were occupied by Armenians continued increasingly. In addition to these, another factor affecting bilateral relations is Turkey's efforts to maximize its interests as a result of the shift of energy lines to Asia, and Azerbaijan's defense financing with income from gas and energy. One of the obstacles in front of a railway project that will cross the borders of Azerbaijan and Turkey from China to Europe was the fact that Nakhchivan, an autonomous region of Azerbaijan, does not have a direct connection with the mainland due to the borders of Armenia. With the railway project that will pass through the region after the Karabakh war, the security of oil and natural gas pipelines was ensured. Armenia has become more dependent on Turkey and Azerbaijan; Russia has become stronger in the region by shifting its military center of gravity to the Baltics. On the Armenian front, the resignation of the President, the protests that led to the election of the parliament as a result of the war, and the victory of Pashinyan in the elections are important for the future of the country. It is planned that the borders between the two countries will be opened after Pashinyan's appointment of a mutual representative with Turkey and the opening of the Zangezur corridor. Thus, Armenia will get rid of its position as a landlock country, which has lasted for about 28 years, and will have the opportunity to integrate into the world's global capitalism. Looking at the Azerbaijani front, Aliyev has become a hero in the country. Although the security of energy transfer and pipelines has been ensured, the presence of Russia's military presence in the country is prone to become a problem in the coming years.

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Armenia will get rid of its position as a landlock country, which has lasted for about 28 years, and will have the opportunity to integrate into the world's global capitalism. Looking at the Azerbaijani front, Aliyev has become a hero in the country.