Editor Note: This article was written in 2022 and remains unchanged; events and developments after this date are not reflected.*

Abstract

Iran and China are two ancient states connected by the historical Silkroad. With the shift of the global energy center of gravity to Asia, how the relations between the two countries were shaped in the post-Imperial period, the world has become important. Belt and Road Initiative, presented to the public by China President Li, brought up the size of Iran's strategic position, which is one of the key connection points for the Asian, European and African continents. This article aims to analyze the historical, political-economic relations between the countries since 1979, when the official relations between Tehran and Beijing began, and to discuss the course of the relations that have undergone a new transformation since 2012.

Key words: China, Iran, Belt and Road, Trade, Oil, Nuclear

Introduction

Although the historical relations of Iran and China go back to the ancient period, the diplomatic relations of these two modern nation-states began in 1971. As of this year, the commercial, political, military and security agreements between the two countries have also begun to increase. Iran entered the administration of the Religious Leadership (Ayatollah), which seized power after 1978 and established a theocratic regime by deporting the current administration. The regime's goal of spreading the fundamental Islamic ideology, and the armed organizations it established in the Middle East for this purpose, and the proxy powers it supports, brought Iran against the western world, especially the United States. The seizure of the consulate building during the protests for the change of government so-called the Islamic revolution, and the hostage crisis in the following years, the attacks on Lebanon and other Middle East countries brought the two countries threshold to crisis many times.

The United States viewed the existence of a regime that compromised human rights, democracy and regional peace as a threat to themselves and their allies. In the following years, America took steps to prevent Iran from becoming a regional power by using various policy tools and to obstacle the steps of creating a structure against its own hegemony. The most well-known and most common of these steps are sanctions [1]. Iran has joined part of an anti-American bloc to avoid sanctions and their consequences. It received uranium and other technical support needed to advance the process of building nuclear weapons from the anti-American front, led by Russia and China [2]. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the fall of the Berlin wall, and China's liberalist policies that began in 1978, and the development of integration into global capitalism, presented opportunities and threats to neighboring countries and the west. Iran has also seen the opportunity to capitalize on these opportunities and has calculated accordingly. The major projects and strategies that Beijing has presented since the middle of the 2010's have been welcomed with a lot of interest and consideration. One of these projects is the Belt and Road initiative. This Road, which has often been on the agenda since 2015, aims at building a commercial corridor between Asia and Europe [3]. The idea of a 'second chance to the states that missed the globalization', which was first introduced to the public with the loudest voice and constituted the propaganda part of the project, not only did it attract attention, but also kept the public interest alive [4]. Pakistan and Iran, struggling with internal and external challenges, have become the biggest purchasers of this slogan. Secondly, the possibility of hot money and investment was very attractive for Iran, which was in a major economic crisis under the American embargo and sanctions, to nullify these sanctions and to implement its regional targets with hot money flow and to fund the production of nuclear weapons. Finally, the fact that giant projects such as infrastructure and construction and countries' ports and airports were made by a foreign financing would increase the support of the governments to the social and public structure by investing less in the private sector. While the social state system was developing, employment would increase. From the Iranian point of view, being a part of this project would provide a significant advantage in the implementation of its goals and against a convectional and asymmetrical secret war suppressed by the United States [5]. Relations between China and Iran are largely dependent on China being the biggest buyer of Iran's oil that Iran cannot export due to sanctions. The two countries have a long history of commercial relations, mostly in the Petro-chemical sector. Although oil was an important source of energy income until recently, China and Iran relations are far beyond this in the new period.

The other side of the relations between the two countries is the filling of the gap opened in the Middle East by a new hegemonic power after the decision to withdraw from the United States of America Afghanistan and the decision of the Iraqi state to expel the US soldiers in the parliament. The other side of China-Iran relations is that another hegemonic power wants to fill the area that would be opened in the region due to America's withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq [6]. The aim of this study is to present arguments on how Iran has become a part of China's grand strategy, including the Belt and Road project, in the redefined global power alignment, and how the pragmatic and tactical relationship of the two countries will progress.

The first part of the article provides a general background on China-Iran relations. In order to analyze how complex and deep the links between the relations between the two countries are and to facilitate the examination of policy changes, the second part includes a historical-political and economic examination of the relations in time intervals of about 10 years. The third part of the article includes observing whether the relationship between China and Iran is moving in an energy-based pragmatic direction or in a connection with strategic depth. In the last part of the article, the direction and future course of the relations with Iran's involvement in the Belt and Road project are argued.

Background of Relations

After the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the 25-year Cooperation Program signed between Iran and China, which was widely covered by the public when it was introduced, started to be implemented, the size of the relations between the two countries came to the fore again. The agreement, which has political, economic and military implications, enables the two countries to improve relations and increase China's influence in the Middle East. The agreement provides benefits to Iran as well as China. The economic crisis created by the sanctions that were extended during the Trump era and imposed on the country by the United States for a long time, and the accompanying political crisis endanger the future of the current administration.

The Iranian administration thinks that the direct investments and hot money that will come through the agreement are an alternative that will be used in the domestic markets to stagnate high inflation and the crisis. The history of relations between the two countries shows that Iran holds an important place in China's great strategy in the Middle East. The relations between Iran and China can be examined in three periods in general.

The first of these was the years between 1978 and 1988, which included the green revolution that would lead Iran to Islamic theocracy and China's post-Mao Post revolution. The second period is the period of 89-2004, which covers the period of unipolar supremacy of America, the winner of the Cold War. The last period includes the period between 2004 and today, which covers the process of being integrated to global capitalism, when China implemented the Belt and Road initiative project by making direct investments in Middle East and other countries.

Relations between Iran and Post-revolutionary China between 1978-88

The first difficult test of relations, which officially began in 78, was the exile of Shah, the arrival of a new Islamic administration, which began in Iran. It was unclear how China's policy of supporting Marxist parties, especially the Tudeh, during the Shah period would affect relations with Iran. After Deng replaced Mao and consolidated his power, dedicated to ending “class struggle” for a Communist society, focusing instead on practical matters of economic development [7]. Even though China supported the Shah's government in the last years of power, the country's Islamic regime took care not to bring China against it in the political arena. Instead, Shah's long-time supporter, America, was on the target, as the Great Satan, responsible for the pre-revolutionary conditions. Another test of the relationship between the two countries was the war between Iran and Iraq that began in 1980 and continued until 1988. The war in Iraq led Iran to a non-Western power and against the West's present attitude of global dominance, intervention and supremacy. There were certain questions that Iran, which wanted to establish a theocratic anti-imperialist and fundamentalist administration by taking social mobilization at its side, would seek assistance from China [8]. Ammunition to be used in the war against Iraq, help to create job opportunities and economic development in the destabilized country, help Iran's nuclear program and China's supportive words in favor of Iran in the United Nations. In terms of China, it had consequences in terms of arms sales, increasing its presence in the Middle East and showing its presence against the American hegemony by emphasizing the historical ties between this country, which claims to be a regional power.

(Millions U.S. $) sources: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Database; Arms Transfer Database; data provided by Dr. Siemon Wezeman; and Direction of Trade Statistics, (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1982–2000).

The percentage of arms as exports to specific countries can also be examined more closely to get a clear sense of their important trade value. In fact, throughout the Iran-Iraq War, China maintained an official position of neutrality and for years denied supplying either side with weapons. Despite these denials, scholars have pieced together enough evidence to link the Chinese to several of these transfers. In the case of Iran, China’s arms sales as a percentage of total exports ranged from 9 to 21% between 1986 and 1988, before dipping after the Iran-Iraq war in the early 1990s, yet still averaging 50% of total Iranian civilian imports in the 10 years after the war.

China's support for Iran to develop its Nuclear capacity between 80-88 years

Iran is the state that the United States of America imposes the most sanctions on in the world today. The majority of the sanctions are implemented to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and to prevent the US and NATO allies, especially Israel, from being targeted in the Middle East. Iran’s location in a “tough neighborhood” with several military powers having their own missile-development programs, a sizeable U.S. presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and nuclear-capable neighbors (Israel, India, Pakistan, and Russia) has made indigenous missile production a necessity for Iranian defense[9] China was particularly interested in supplying Iran for its ability to use oil shipments for partial payment of goods, meeting China’s energy needs. Iran was also seen as a desirable client when it indicated that countries supportive of it during the Iran-Iraq war would receive priority in post-war reconstruction contracts, an attractive carrot for a booming Chinese construction and engineering industry. Iran has largely benefited from the assistance of Russia and China in its nuclear weapons development activities. Nuclear cooperation between China and Iran started in the 1980s, when the Chinese filled the void left by the French to construct a research reactor for Iran. Iran had already established a nuclear research center at Isfahan, and in 1985 the Chinese agreed to supply four teaching and research reactors and later supplied fissile material for the reactor cores[10].

In the midst of the Iran-Iraq war, on the one hand, China, which provided military ammunition support, on the other hand, supported Iran in its peaceful use of nuclear weapons. However, China's support was limited in the 1980s. Support was often given in the form of advice and simple technology transfer, based on Iran's refusal to seek nuclear weapons.

The second period of the relations between the two countries is the post-cold war period, in which US hegemony and unipolar dominance prevailed after the Iraq war. During these years, China-Iran relations continued in military, technology, commercial, economic and political fields.

Relations between Iran and China in the post-cold war unipolar world

With the end of the war between Iran and Iraq that lasted for more than 8 years, both China-Iran relations and Iran's foreign policy relations entered a new phase. With the death of Iran's supreme leader Khomeini in 89, a new political period called the Second Republic was entered, while the largest demonstrations were held in China since 1949 in the same years. These demonstrations, supported by western countries, especially America, made China willing to strengthen its ties with non-western bloc countries [11]. During the war with Iraq, Iran suppressed the deep-rooted Marxist and communist movements and Kurdish armed groups in the country to a large extent. It gained respect over the SHIA population of Iraq from neighboring countries and created an organic bond with organizations such as Hezbollah, which was established next to its eternal enemy, Zionist Israel. This position of Iran has put Iran in a position too important to be ignored in the Chinese policy of developing links with third world countries. Expanded partnership with Iran was useful to Beijing in two main ways. First, Iranian support could be used internally and internationally to substantiate Beijing’s argument that Western criticism of the repression of June1989 was a form of interference and cultural arrogance. More important, Chinese support for Iran penalized Washington for its “anti-China policies” and demonstrated to Washington the U.S need for China’s cooperation in the Middle East [12]

The declaration of war against Iraq by the American-led coalition in 91 enabled Iran and China to meet again on a common ground. Both countries did not recognize Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and advocated the withdrawal of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein from the occupied lands. They also expressed their opposition to a possible American intervention. Both countries were aware that a possible military intervention would make America a hegemonic power in the middle east and this situation would create a status against their regional interests [13] They believed that the problem should be resolved by regional countries through peaceful means. China, Yang said, was against a military solution to the crisis. Yang also stressed Iran’s “important role” in the Gulf and the Middle East[14] .Since China is a member of the United Nations with the right of veto, the US's enforcement of sanctions against Iraq before the UN depended on China's voting rights. This created, in Qian’s words, an“advantageous opportunity to promote the normalization of Sino-American relations[15].”

China did not use its veto right during the sanctions vote, allowing the United States to open up some space for its own activity in the Middle East. China's bilateral strategy came into play here again, as in the examples of its bilateral arms sales in the Iraq war and its policy of peaceful support to the nuclear program under certain conditions. China’s top leaders decided to send Qian on a mission to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq (and not Iran!) in November 1990 in order to “seek a peaceful solution” to the Gulf crisis and “increase China’s international stature and regional influence[16].”While China was approaching Iran due to the pressure exerted on it by the United States, on the other hand, relations were being developed with the Arab world, especially Egypt, which was seen as a traitor by Iran because of its agreement with Israel. Thus, China would try to become an active and hegemonic power in the region by establishing a triangle relationship between Iran, America and the Arab world. However, after the rapid victory of the US-led coalition in 91, Iran and China would be on the same front against the increasing American influence in the middle east. The fact that oil and resources came under American hegemony encouraged regional countries to cooperate more closely with the United States, while at the same time worrying the neighboring country Iran and powers such as China, which have interests in the Middle East. For both country Gulf War was a major advance for U.S. hegemonism in its eforts to dominate the Middle East and the world.

This was seen as an opportunity for Iran to pull China to the Middle East and expand the anti-American front. Chinese leaders, on the other hand, were clearly unwilling to assist Iran's regional aspirations. The trade agreements they made with countries such as Egypt and Israel continued between China and these countries, despite the contradictions with Iran's regional interests. In the several years after the 1991 Gulf War the Sino-Iranian antihegemony partnership reached its apogee [17].

During his visit to Iran that same year, Li: “We are against the domination of the u.s. or of a minority over the world, and against the creation of the new order by the u.s. in international relations, and we are in complete agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran on this point [18].”

These sentences are of paramount importance to see Iran and China relations from China's point of view. Establishing alliances against American hegemony with all third world countries, especially the Middle East, will be at the forefront of China's policy principles in the coming years. Iran was also a port, transfer point for China. For example, from the year 89, when the Islamic movement seized power in Khartoum in Sudan, until the sanctions were implemented in 95, China both provided aid to the Iran-backed government by transferring the weapons financed by Iran to Sudan and earned 300 million dollars from the supply of weapons. In 1995, Clinton cut of all u.s. trade and investment with Iran, including u.s. company purchase of Iranian oil for resale overseas [19]. Upon the increase of American pressures and sanctions, Iranian officials made support attempts during their visits to Asian countries. China was one of these countries. After Velayati’s visit to China, Chinese officials implicitly criticized the US targeting Iran and said that no country is allowed to dominate over other countries. Iran's visits to Asian countries had several main purposes. These were support for nuclear weapons development, economic aid and investment, multilateral partnership agreements that would break the isolation against American oppression and isolation. China's stance in the face of sanctions imposed by the United States for violating regional stability and international laws in 1995 was again in line with Beijing's bilateral strategy. In the statements made through the media and official channels, it was stated: “the move futile and not conducive to settlement of existing issues between the United States and Iran. Such moves would only worsen tension, differences between countries could be resolved only through negotiation and mutual respect, not through pressure and threat[20] . Two years later, by 97, Beijing struck a deal with the United States terminating Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran, and ending Chinese sales to Iran of advanced antiship cruise missiles, the weapons most threatening to oil tankers and u.s. warships. Although Iran was angry at this step, since the Iranian administration was largely isolated, it still depended on China for oil to be exported, economic development and army modernization. Furthermore, because China was also facing US pressure, the Iranian authorities launched the crime in the United States, which they called the Great Satan [21].

Two illuminating events regarding the dynamics and dimensions of the relations between Tehran and Beijing took place in the 90s. The first of these is the Beijing Massacre in 1989, which was widely covered by the world public opinion and condemned by international organizations, and the other is the Taiwan crisis with the United States between the years 95-96. America's efforts to unite the western blog against China in the field of human rights and democracy, and the statements that addressed Taiwan at the official level, also affected the course of Beijing's relations with third world countries, especially Iran.

In 99, one of the turning points in the history of China's struggle against American hegemony took place. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, chaos prevailed in the Balkans. The Chinese embassy was targeted during the US bombing of Serbia's capital, Belgrade, with the allegation that Serbia was carrying out ethnic cleansing. Due to Russia's veto in the UN, the Kosovo intervention by NATO and the bombing of the China embassy in the meantime increased the anti-American nationalist anger in the country [22]. In the international arena, Beijing accused the United States of interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states, and in the following years entered a process in which various agreements were signed with Iran. After the September 11 attacks in the USA, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the relations in the strategic triangle of Iran, America and China entered a new phase of transformation. The fact that the Sunni Islamist Taliban gained power in Afghanistan and became dangerous for the future of Shia Iran brought America and Iran back together after the contra scandal. While Iran provided intelligence to the United States about this country, which it had been watching closely for a long time, the American administration also granted some concessions about new sanctions, release of frozen funds and Iran's presence in the region. In terms of China, this did not mean that it lost its trump card against the United States, but the fact that states in Central Asia approached the United States and provided military bases left Beijing dismayed. However, for Iran, this situation was not long-term and sustainable. Against the ´Great Satan´ metaphor, the American President Bush added ´Axis of Devil` to his political dictionary for North Korea, Iraq and Iran. Iran and China were deeply opposed to the United States and Britain's attack on Iraq in 2003, despite the opposition of France, Russia and China. On the heels of the u.s. ouster of Saddam Hussein’s regime in early 2003, and as information about previously undisclosed Iranian uranium enrichment activities came to the surface, the United States began pushing to bring the issue of Iran’s nuclear programs before the u.n. Security Council for consideration of sanctions. Many Chinese analysts saw this as the next step in the American drive to dominate the Middle East: the Iran was the next u.s. target[23].

In summary, the relations between Iran and China developed from the 1990s to the beginning of 2004, largely as a reaction to the actions and policies of the global power America. Despite this, progress has also been made in the fields of army modernization, peaceful use of nuclear energy, and economic support. As a result, it is obvious that in this period, cooperation in the political field is more dominant than in other fields. The fact that China signed an agreement with the United States on the anti-China nuclear issue in 1997 and that China did not prevent the United States in Iraq sanctions gives some clues about Iran's position. For the relations in the 90s, it can be deduced that the Sino-Iranian relations still lacked strategic depth and could be ignored as a result of the possible American China treaty.

Customer-Supplier Relationship or Strategic Partnership?

In the recent years, a situation has arisen in the world where the energy center of gravity has shifted to Asia, especially China. In the new stage of Chinese economic development that began with the coming to power of President Xi Jinping in 2012, China’s economy is increasingly intertwined with the global economy, and China is trying to manage its increasing interests in the changing world by introducing various initiatives. Put differently, in this new period, China is changing its role in the international political economy from a rule taker to a rule maker[24]. The structural change of BRICS, Asian Investment Bank, Belt and Road Initiative were symbols of this economic diplomacy front. In particular, Belt and Road has been the most comprehensive and most researched area in terms of the projects it contains and its vision. In the framework of this Initiative, China is attempting to create a form of China-centered convergence based on five pillars: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds among a wide spectrum of countries[25].

For an isolated country like Iran, any force aimed at redistributing power on the global stage is considered an opportunity and can help the country gain greater freedom of movement, desecurity and normalization, and gradually gain more freedom of movement in the international arena. In the big picture, the rise of China as a 'game changer' and the initiatives put forward by Beijing, especially the BRI, provide Iran with significant economic opportunities as well as geopolitical [26]. This initiative is considered a strategic opportunity for rebuilding the Iranian economy and its development. This is because, on the one hand, the persistent tensions with the United States has limited Iran’s options for attracting international financial resources to advance its economic growth, and on the other hand, the country is in an increasing need for such resources in order to promote economic development and increase the legitimacy of the political system. It was mentioned that over the past four decades, Iran has been under the most stringent international sanctions. In this vein, since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, no substantial foreign investment has taken place in Iran. Iranian industries have not been updated, and their contacts with global industrial innovations have been largely lost. Hence, Iran’s share of global trade has been severely reduced[27]. In addition, under the current circumstances and into the foreseeable future, China is one of the most important options for attracting the international resources needed to support Iran's economic development. China is the most important buyer of Iranian oil and receives about a third of Iranian oil exports. Beijing's enormous demand for energy resources has led to its long-standing trade relations with Iran. Due to Iran's need to export its energy resources, this Initiative can provide a new framework for more extensive Chinese investments in the Iranian energy industry. It has provided loans at various levels not only for the energy sector, but also for the construction of a railway project from China to Istanbul, infrastructure activities and increasing the operability of oil facilities, which will support the economic development of China Iran. After Iran signed the nuclear treaty in 2015, China remained the country's largest foreign direct investor. However, the withdrawal of American President Trump from the nuclear deal in 2018 has made Iran a dangerous country for foreign investors again. While European countries withdrew from the Iranian market, medium and small-sized companies from China continued to carry out their activities. However, new investments and global-scale international companies avoided direct investments for fear of being affected by American sanctions. Based on statistics published by the Iranian Customs Department, roughly 25 of every 100 dollars of Iranian imports in 2016 were from China.35 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the second exporter of goods to Iran[28].

Since many Chinese exports to the Middle East takes place through Dubai,36 some Iranian economists believe that part of the UAE exports to Iran is essentially Chinese exports[29]. However, some projects carried out within the BRI framework somehow compete with Iran’s interests and economic priorities. China's increasing cooperation with Asian states, the decreasing dependence of these countries on Iran for operating transit routes, the possibility of direct access to the Baltic Sea as a single route by providing direct access to Turkey after Azerbaijan's victory in Karabakh will harm Iran's position in the near future. Especially China's investments in Central Asia projects and Pakistan ports are a matter of concern for Iran.

Iran's Belt and Road initiative role not only provides a great role for China in accessing Africa, it is also of great value for transportation to Europe via Turkey and to Oman via the Persian Sea. As seen on the map above, Pakistan and Iran are two important points for the China West Indian Ocean geoeconomics strategy.

The most important competitive aspect between the Iranian transit projects in the region and those of BRI is the rivalry between the projects for the development of Chabahar and Gwadar ports. Since the time the Chabahar agreement was signed, some Pakistani authorities have called it a rival for the Gwadar project[30]. This port, which is exempt from American Sanctions, can provide China's access to an African port via Iran and give it a strategic feature that can open up space for China to rank first in the market of the Horn of Africa countries.

Iran’s Role in Belt and Road Initiative

Iran and China economic relations are guiding on how much both countries need each other. Although the economic relations of China and Iran are interpreted as pragmatic cooperation due to Iran's inability to sell its oil due to sanctions and China's growing need for oil, the situation goes beyond that. In the relations between the two countries, it is also notable that China is trying to make some moves to impose policy on Iran by using the energy sector. China's nuclear strategy towards Iran is a puzzle in which complex relations and factors are active. Starting in early 2012, China sharply cut its purchase of oil from Iran despite being under no obligation to do so as such reductions were only mandated by unilateral U.S. sanctions rather than the United Nations. In 2012 and 2013, China’s purchases fell 23 percent, constituting 11 percent of the total 46 percent fall in Iranian oil sales during that period[31]. On the one hand, Iran's sitting at the nuclear deal table was also compatible with China's interests. Avoiding a possible American and Israeli intervention after the nuclear deal would give China an opportunity to support Iran's industrialization and economic development. Secondly, the US targeting Iran would increase the US hegemony in the Middle East after the Iraq War. Chinese leaders recognized that another war in the Gulf would have been a disaster for China’s economy, its ambitious One Belt One Road project. In 2002, Iran avoided nuclear control for nearly 6 years, as the anti-Iranian nuclear research authorization at the UN was faced with China's veto.

Although it is frequently repeated that the Beijing administration is against Iran's development of nuclear weapons, at the same time, China continues to help Iran in different sectors and fields in order to be one of the actors on the table in the nuclear talks between the USA and Iran. During 2012–2016, Chinese companies became the largest investors in and constructors of transport infrastructure in Iranian neighbor states, particularly those in Central Asia. Therefore, Iran’s increasing need in the area of transport infrastructure and the growing capabilities of Chinese companies have created more opportunities for sharing interests for the two countries. The fact that China increased its oil imports from Iran during the nuclear talks that the Biden administration started at the end of 2021 and that are currently ongoing in Vienna proves this. China doubled down on imports of Iranian and crude in 2021, taking the most from the U.S.-sanctioned regime in three years, as refiners brushed off the risk of penalties to scoop up cheap oil. Thus, by evading sanctions, Iran provides a hot money flow to the economy by exporting oil, and China also meets its energy needs by buying sanction oil cheaper[32]. China also appears to be taking advantage of the EU embargo against Iran to receive significant discounts on Iranian oil[34]. This may cause some tensions between the two countries in the short term, but an increasingly isolated Iran may have no other choice but to become even more dependent on China as an economic partner. Although, China is in the paradoxical position of having more leverage than almost any other country vis-à-vis Iran, but also having the most to lose should more broadly punitive sanctions be imposed or war break out, a fact not lost on Chinese analysts and policymakers [35].

Therefore, any action, sanction attempt against Iran gives reason for China to be concerned, to continue operating on the pro-Iranian front. In addition, China’s investments in Iran have potentially enhanced Chinese energy security by developing a solid relationship with a supplier unlikely to be intimidated into cutting oil exports to China in the event of a U.S.-Chinese military conflict [36].

Energy, Cooperation and Trade

According to China’s official document Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, advancing multipolarism, respecting the models of development chosen by different countries, promoting cultural diversity, peaceful coexistence and respecting the sovereignty of states are the basic principles in the development of this initiative. For Iran, being a part of this project was seen as an opportunity to pierce the investments of Great Satan, to mislead those who claim that the Islamic regime has failed, to fund proxy forces, and to perpetuate its ideological ambitions. In his visit with the Chinese President, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei referred to the BRI as a wise idea and welcomed the cooperation of the two countries in this framework (Khamenei, 2016)

In the operational plan published by the Chinese Government Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, five areas were introduced as priorities for cooperation between the countries involved. These areas are: policy coordination, facilitation of connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds (State Council, 2015). Considering the importance of these areas for Iran, the following can be said that Policy coordination, facilitation of connectivity and Trade areas are more important than other areas due to imposing sanctions.

Policy Coordination

According to Xi, the area of political coordination of the initiative, the two countries should increase policy coordination and continue to support each other's basic national interests to reach greater consensus and establish a stronger basis for bilateral cooperation (Xi, 2016). Although there was political coordination of relations in Iran-China historical political relations, this was to a large extent where there was a lack of coordination at the micro level and macro policies. After the announcement of the Belt and Road initiative, Iranian president Rouhani and the Chinese leader met 5 times from 2013 to 2016. The highest number of such meetings since the establishment of relations between the two countries in 1971. Therefore, summit diplomacy could be considered as important for policy coordination between the two countries in the context of the BRI.

Facilitation of Connectivity and Trade

facilitation of connectivity is the title of China's continuing cooperation in order to develop infrastructure activities between countries, to bring economic vitality on transportation routes, and to increase their energy and technical capability potentials. Thus, the supply chain between member countries, starting from Asia and extending to Africa and Europe, can be reached uninterruptedly and in a way that maximizes profits. The most effective project in this field in Iran was the Tehran–Qom–Isfahan high-speed railway. The project is implemented by a Chinese consortium led by the China Railway Engineering Corporation in 2015 and Completion was planned in 2021. According to Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Construction Abbas Akhondi, the first phase of this project would be carried out at a cost of US$22bn (Akhondi, 2016a). The Chinese contracting company would provide the finance and carry out 40 percent of construction (Azadani, 2016). When it came to 2021, the project still could not be implemented due to covid, the supply of construction materials, and the problem of funds. According to Vaezi, the large amount of investment required could create important opportunities for cooperation between the two countries (Vaezi, 2016).

Iran is China’s second largest trade partner in the Middle East and China is Iran’s main trade partner. China is the largest market for Iran’s oil and non-oil trade commodities. Since the sanctions imposed, China has continued to buy oil from Iran through food, construction, and basic living supplies.

Conclusion

The cooperation between Iran and China, which officially started in 1979, has faced various tests until today. Iraq-Iran war, US sanctions against Iran, Taiwan Crisis are just a few of them. The fact that both countries are ruled by authoritarian leaders and are accused of lacking democracy by western countries, their regional and global interests are similar, and America's policy against the interests of both countries are the similarities that bring Iran and China together. In addition, China's growing population and energy dependency to meet the demand push the country to seek a reliable trading partner. During the 25-year cooperation agreement, China's foreign ministry said in an interview with the media, "Our relations with Iran will not be affected by the current situation, but will be permanent and strategic. Iran decides independently on its relations with other countries and is not like some countries that change positions with a phone call”. These words showed the need of China for a strategic and reliable partner in case of possible conflict with America and Taiwan, Uyghur, South China sea. The sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran since 1995 for its steps towards the development of proxy forces and nuclear weapons were tried to be pierced for a long time and to minimize the effect, again with the help of China. In the Belt and Road project, long-term credit opportunities were offered for the sustainability of the port, railways and oil production infrastructure, with special attention paid to Iran. While Japan and other western countries withdrew from the Iranian market after the sanctions, China increased the amount of oil it imported from Iran. Thus, in the 80s, the support covering the use of military weapons and peaceful nuclear power entered an anti-American political trajectory in the 90s, and in the mid-2000s, it entered the strategic partnership phase after the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative. However, it should be added that another aspect of China's Iran policy is China and Us relations. In 1997, as a result of the agreement with the United States in the Taiwan crisis, China suspended a number of agreements that included the sale of arms to Iran and the modernization of the military army. In 2012, before the nuclear talks, China significantly reduced the oil it imported from Iran, forcing the country to sit at the peace table. Moreover, the fact that the US brought the Uyghur issue in the Xingang region and the Taiwan issue, which is one of the red lines of Iran's foreign policy, to the agenda resulted in Iran's acceptance to the Shanghai cooperation organization. As a result, although China sees Iran as a bridge between Asia and the Middle East and tries to maximize its strategic gains, the American-China relationship and agreement will continue to play an important role in relations with Iran in the perspective of China. On the Iranian front, the situation is somewhat simpler. Tehran needs an ally who can act as its spokesperson, aiming to provide the flow of hot money to the economy suffering under Sanctions, and to help the country get rid of isolation in the United Nations. Therefore, any allied country that can offer hot money and direct investment in Iran will be positively received by the leaders and public opinion.

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Iran decides independently on its relations with other countries and is not like some countries that change positions with a phone call”. These words showed the need of China for a strategic and reliable partner in case of possible conflict with America and Taiwan, Uyghur, South China sea